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This paper provides an alternative approach to Duffie and Lando
[Econometrica 69 (2001) 633–664] for obtaining a reduced form credit
risk model from a structural model. Duffie and Lando obtain a re-
duced form model by constructing an economy where the market sees
the manager’s information set plus noise. The noise makes default a
surprise to the market. In contrast, we obtain a reduced form model
by constructing an economy where the market sees a reduction of the
manager’s information set. The reduced information makes default a
surprise to the market. We provide an explicit formula for the default
intensity based on an Aze´ma martingale, and we use excursion theory
of Brownian motions to price risky debt.
1. Introduction. Reduced form models have become important tools in
the risk management of credit risk [for background references see Jarrow and
Yu (2001) and Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002)]. One reason for this is that
they usually provide a better fit to market data than structural models do
[see Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984), Jarrow, van Deventer and Wang
(2002) and Eom, Helwege and Huang (2000)]. Reduced form models take
a firm’s default process as exogenous with the time of default a stopping
time. When in addition the time is totally inaccessible, the market cannot
predict the time of default. Yet, managers working within a firm surely
know when default is imminent. From a manager’s perspective, default is an
accessible stopping time (predictable). Usually, in the structural approach
default occurs when the firm’s value, a continuous sample path process, hits
a barrier. This formulation is consistent with the manager’s perspective but
inconsistent with reduced form models.
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Duffie and Lando (2001) link the two perspectives by introducing noise
into the market’s information set, transforming the manager’s accessible de-
fault time from the structural approach into the market’s inaccessible default
time of a reduced form model. Duffie and Lando postulate that the market
can only observe the firm’s asset value plus noise at equally spaced, discrete
time points (and not continuously). And, when default occurs, the market
is immediately informed. This noise generates the market’s surprise with
respect to default, because the firm could nearly be in default ( just about
to hit the barrier) and the market not yet aware of its imminence. Kusuoka
(1999) extends Duffie and Lando’s model to continuous time observations
of the firm’s asset value plus noise. Kusuoka’s solution is an application of
continuous time filtering theory.
This approach to constructing a reduced form credit model presumes
that the market has the same information set as the firm’s management,
but with noise appended. (Filtering theory was originally formulated for
electronic signal processing where the physical problem corresponds to a
situation where an electronic signal is received with noise and the noise
needs to be “filtered” out.) An interpretation is that accounting reports
and/or management press releases either purposefully (e.g., Enron) or inad-
vertently add extraneous information that obscures the market’s knowledge
of the firm’s asset value. Management knows the firm’s value (because this
knowledge determines default), but they cannot (or will not) make it known
to the market. The market’s task is to remove this extraneous noise. Al-
though possible in many situations, this characterization of management’s
information versus the market’s is not exhaustive. An alternative and equally
plausible characterization is that the market has the same information as
a firm’s management, but just less of it. Accounting reports and/or man-
agement press releases provide just a reduced set of the information that is
available.
Consistent with this alternative perspective, we provide a second approach
to the construction of a reduced form credit risk model from a structural
model. In our approach, the firm’s cash flows, a continuous sample path
process, provide the sufficient statistic for default. If the firm’s cash flows
remain negative for an extended period of time, the firm after exhausting
both its lines of credit and easily liquidated assets, defaults. Management
observes the firm’s cash flows. In contrast, the market observes only a very
coarse partitioning of the manager’s information set. The market knows only
that the cash flow is negative; the firm is experiencing financial distress and
the duration of the negative cash flow event, nothing else. This information
structure has default being an accessible stopping time for management,
but an inaccessible stopping time for the market, yielding the reduced form
credit risk model.
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To illustrate the economic concepts involved, this paper concentrates on
developing a specific example to obtain analytic results. The analytic re-
sults solidify intuition and make the economic arguments more transparent.
Generalizations and extensions will be readily apparent once the example
is well understood. It is our hope that this paper will motivate additional
research into this area. Our example provides an explicit representation of
the firm’s default intensity using an Aze´ma’s martingale [see Emery (1989)].
To illustrate the usefulness of this result, we compute the value of a risky
zero-coupon bond using excursion theory of Brownian motions. For another
application of excursion theory to option pricing see Chesney, Jeanblanc-
Picque´ and Yor (1997).
An outline for this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the structural
model. Section 3 presents the reduced form model, Section 4 values a risky
zero-coupon bond in the reduced form model, while Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. The structural model. We consider a continuous trading economy
with a money market account where default-free zero-coupon bonds are
traded. In this economy there is a risky firm with debt outstanding in the
form of zero-coupon bonds. The details of these traded assets are not needed
now, but will be provided later as necessity dictates. The market for these
traded securities is assumed to be arbitrage free, but not necessarily com-
plete.
We begin with a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,Q) satisfying
the usual conditions. Time T > 0 is the final date in the model. The prob-
ability Q is an equivalent martingale probability measure under which the
normalized prices of the traded securities follow a martingale. Normalization
is by the value of the money market account. The no-arbitrage assumption
guarantees the existence, but not the uniqueness of such a probability mea-
sure [see Duffie (1996)].
2.1. Management ’s information. Let X be the cash balances of the firm,
normalized by the value of the money market account, with the following
stochastic differential equation:
dXt = σ dWt, X0 = x(2.1)
with x> 0, σ > 0, and whereW is a standard Brownian motion on the given
probability space.
The cash balances of the firm are initialized at x > 0 units of the money
market account. One should interpret this quantity as the “target” or “opti-
mal” cash balances for the firm. An optimal cash balance could exist because
if the firm holds too much cash, it forgoes attractive investment projects and
incurs increased tax liabilities, while if it has too little cash, it increases the
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likelihood of bankruptcy and the occurrence of third party costs [see Brealey
and Myers (2001) for related discussion]. The firm attempts to maintain
cash balances at this target level, but fluctuations occur due to its operating
needs, for example, meeting payrolls, paying suppliers, receiving payments
from accounts receivable, and so on. However, without loss of generality, to
simplify the presentation we assume that x= 0 and σ = 1, as well.
Under the martingale measure, cash balances have no drift term. Under
the empirical measure, however, one would expect that the cash balances
should drift at the spot rate of interest. This is consistent with the firm hold-
ing its cash balances in the money market account and trying to maintain
the target level balance.
The firm’s management observes the firm’s cash balances. Cash balances
can be positive, zero or negative. Negative cash balances correspond to situa-
tions where payments owed are not paid, and the firm is in financial distress.
2.2. The default process. Let Z := {t ∈ [0, T ] :X(t) = 0} denote the times
when the firm’s cash balances hit zero. When the cash balances hit zero, the
firm has no cash left for making current payments owed. The firm is in
financial distress. With zero or negative cash balances, debt payments can
only be made by liquidating the firm’s assets or by accessing bank lines of
credit. The firm can exist with negative cash balances for only a limited
period of time. We now formalize this default process.
Associated with the zero set, we define the following function:
g(t) := sup{s≤ t :Xs = 0}.
The random time g(t) corresponds to the last time (before t) that cash
balances hit zero. Let
τα := inf
{
t > 0 : t− g(t)≥ α
2
2
, where Xs < 0 for s ∈ (g(t−), t)
}
for some α ∈R+ be the random time that measures the onset of a potential
default situation for the firm. Formally, τα is the first time that the firm’s
cash balances have continued to be negative for at least α2/2 units of time.
The constant α is a parameter of the default process (that could be estimated
from market data). We let τ denote the time of default. We assume that
τ := inf{t > τα :Xt = 2Xτα}.
Default occurs the first time, after τα, that the cash balances double in
magnitude. The intuition is that after being below zero for a long time, the
firm uses up all its slack (lines of credit, etc.) to meet its debt payments. If it
ever hits 2Xτα afterwards, it has no slack left, so it defaults. The doubling in
absolute magnitude of the cash balances prior to default is only for analytic
convenience, and it has no economic content. The generalization of this
assumption is a subject for future research. The above process is what the
firm’s management observes.
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3. The reduced form model. This section studies the structural model
under the market’s information set. It is shown here that the bankruptcy
process, as viewed by the market, follows a reduced form model where the
indicator function of the default time is a point process with an intensity.
In contrast to the manager’s information, the market does not see the
firm’s cash balances. Instead, until the firm has had prolonged negative cash
balances for a certain time, that is, until random time τα, the market only
knows when the firm has positive cash balances or when it has negative
or zero cash balances, and whether the cash balances are above or below
the default threshold 2Xτα afterwards. In this respect, we introduce a new
process:
Yt =
{
Xt, for t < τα,
2Xτα −Xt, for t≥ τα.
Note that Y is also an F -Brownian motion and
τ = inf{t≥ τα :Yt = 0}.
Let
sign(x) =
{
1, if x > 0,
−1, if x≤ 0.
Set G˜t := σ{sign(Ys);s ≤ t} and let (Gt)0≤t≤T denote the Q-complete and
right continuous version of the filtration (G˜t)0≤t≤T ; (Gt)0≤t≤T is the infor-
mation set that the market observes. As seen, the market’s information set
is a very coarse filtering of the manager’s information set. In essence, the
market observes when the firm is in financial distress, and the duration of
this situation.
Given this information, the market values the firm’s liabilities by taking
conditional expectations under the martingale measure Q. This valuation is
studied in the next section.
We now derive the intensity for the default time as seen by the market.
Let Y˜t = 2/
√
piYt. Then signs and zero sets of Y and Y˜ are the same. Define
Mt := E[Y˜t|Gt]. Then, M is the Aze´ma’s martingale on (Ω, (Gt)0≤t≤T ,Q).
[Note that Aze´ma’s martingale has already been used in finance, but in a
diferent context; see Dritschel and Protter (1999).] Its quadratic variation
satisfies the following “structure equation”:
d[M,M ]t = dt−Mt− dMt.(3.1)
Aze´ma’s martingale is a strong Markov process. For an extensive treatment
of Aze´ma’s martingale and the structure equation, see Emery (1989). We
also have the following formula for M :
Mt = sign(Yt)
√
2
√
t− g¯t,(3.2)
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where g¯t := sup{s ≤ t :Ys = 0}. It is easily seen that τ can be equivalently
written as
τ = inf{t > 0 :∆Mt ≥ α}.
Therefore, τ is a jump time of Aze´ma’s martingale, hence it is totally inacces-
sible in the filtration (Gt)0≤t≤T . Also note that τα = inf{t > 0 :Mt− ≤−α}.
However, ∆Mt = −Mt−1[Mt− 6=Mt]. So, τα ≤ τ a.s. Furthermore, τα is a
predictable stopping time which implies Q[τ = τα] = 0. Hence, τα < τ a.s.
Define Nt := 1[t≥τ ]. By the Doob–Meyer decomposition [see, e.g., Protter
(1990), page 90], there exists a continuous, increasing, and predictable (also
known as locally natural) process, A, such that N − A is a G-martingale
which has only one jump, at τ , and of size equal to 1.
Theorem 3.1. τ has a G-intensity, that is, A is of the form At =∫ t∧τ
0 λs ds. Furthermore, λt = 1[t>τα]1/(2[t− g¯t−]) for 0≤ t≤ τ , and λt = 0
for t > τ .
Proof. Let At =At∧τ . Then
Ht :=Nt −At =
∫ t∧τ
0
hs dMs(3.3)
for some G-predictable process hs since M possesses the predictable repre-
sentation property. [This is proved in Emery (1989).] Since A is continuous
and of finite variation, and N is a quadratic pure jump semimartingale, we
have
[H,H]t = [N,N ]t =Nt.(3.4)
Also,
[H,H]t =
∫ t∧τ
0
h2s d[M,M ]s
(3.5)
=
∫ t∧τ
0
h2s ds−
∫ t∧τ
0
h2sMs− dMs,
where the second equality follows from (3.1). Combining (3.3)–(3.5) yields∫ t∧τ
0
h2s ds−
∫ t∧τ
0
h2sMs− dMs −At =
∫ t∧τ
0
hs dMs,
which implies∫ t∧τ
0
h2s ds−At =
∫ t∧τ
0
h2sMs− dMs +
∫ t∧τ
0
hs dMs.(3.6)
The left-hand side of the previous expression is continuous. Hence∫ t∧τ
0
(h2sMs−+ hs)dMs = 0.(3.7)
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We compute the predictable quadratic variation to get∫ t∧τ
0
h2s(hsMs−+ 1)
2 ds= 0.(3.8)
The optional sampling theorem implies that (N −A)t∧τα = 0, since N = 0
before and at τα. Therefore we get h = 0 on [0, τα]. On the other hand,
(3.8) gives hs = 0 or hs =−1/Ms− on [τα, τ ]. But (3.3) implies hs cannot be
identically 0 on (τα, τ ], and we see that hs =−1[s>τα]1/Ms− satisfies (3.7).
Therefore we deduce a version of H which is given by
Ht =−
∫ t∧τ
0
1[s>τα]
1
Ms−
dMs
and thus H jumps only at τ and its jump size is given by
∆Hτ =−1[τ>τα]
1
Mτ−
∆Mτ =− 1
Mτ−
(−Mτ−) = 1.
Therefore, (3.6) and (3.7) together imply
At =
∫ t∧τ
0
h2s ds
=
∫ t∧τ
0
1[s≥τα]
1
M2s−
ds.

We choose the intensity equal to 0 after time τ , although other choices
might be possible since we are dealing with
∫ t∧τ
0 λs ds. This theorem shows
that under the market’s information set, default is given by a totally inac-
cessible stopping time, generating a reduced form model from the market’s
perspective. We have an explicit representation of the intensity process as
given by λt = 1[t>τα]1/(2[t − g¯t−]). The firm’s default intensity is zero un-
til time τα is reached. After time τα, the default intensity declines with the
length of time that the firm remains in financial distress (t− g¯t−). The inter-
pretation is that the longer the firm survives in the state of financial distress,
the less likely it is to default. Presumably, the firm is more likely to recover
and not reach the default magnitude of cash balances given by 2Xτα . With
this intensity, the market can value risky bonds and credit derivatives. This
valuation is discussed in the next section.
4. Valuation of a risky zero-coupon bond. Perhaps one of the most im-
portant uses of reduced form credit risk models is to price risky bonds
and credit derivatives. This section studies the pricing of risky zero-coupon
bonds. Let (St)t∈[0,T ] denote the price process of a risky zero coupon bond
issued by this firm that pays $1 at time T if no default occurs prior to that
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date, and zero dollars otherwise. Then, under the no arbitrage assumption,
S is given by
St = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
ru du
)
1[τ>T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
1[τ>t],(4.1)
where ru is the instantaneous interest rate at time u, and E refers to the
expectation under risk neutral probability law.
To facilitate the evaluation of expression (4.1), we will assume that inter-
est rates are deterministic. In this case, the price of the risky bond becomes
St = exp
(
−
∫ T
t
ru du
)
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt]1[τ>t].(4.2)
Let Vt = 1[t<T ]E[exp(−
∫ T
t λu du)|Gt], where λ is the intensity process as
given in Theorem 3.1. Duffie, Schroder and Skiadas (1996) give the following
formula for E[1[τ>T ]|Gt]:
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt] = Vt −E[∆Vτ |Gt] on [t < τ ].
The rest of this section is devoted to the computation of this conditional
expectation. Define Lα := τ − g¯τα ; Lα is the length of the first excursion
of Brownian motion below zero exceeding length α2/2. Note that Vt = 1 on
[t < T ] after τ . On [t < τ ],
Vt = 1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λu du
)∣∣∣Gt
]
+ 1[t<τα]E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λu du
)∣∣∣Gt
]
=+1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]
√
t− g¯t E
[
1√
τ − g¯t1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.3)
+ 1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]
√
t− g¯t√
T − g¯t
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt](4.4)
+ 1[t<τα]
α√
2
E
[
1√
τ − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.5)
+ 1[t<τα]
α√
2
E
[
1√
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T<τ ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.6)
+ 1[t<τα]E[1[τα>T ]|Gt].(4.7)
We next evaluate expressions (4.3)–(4.7). The distribution of the length of an
excursion conditional on the age of the excursion is given in Chung (1976).
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Conditional expectation in (4.3) on the event [τα ≤ t < τ ],
E
[
1√
τ − g¯t1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[
1√
Lα
1[Lα≤T−g¯t]
∣∣∣Gt
]
=
∫ T−g¯t
t−g¯t
1
2
√
l
√
t− g¯t
l3
dl
=
√
t− g¯t
2
(
1
t− g¯t −
1
T − g¯t
)
.
Conditional expectation in (4.4) on the event [τα ≤ t < τ ],
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt] = Q[T − g¯t <Lα|Gt]
=
∫ ∞
T−g¯t
1
2
√
t− g¯t
l3
dl
=
√
t− g¯t
T − g¯t .
Conditional expectation in (4.5) on the event [τα > t],
E
[
1√
τ − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[
E
[
1√
τ − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gτα
]∣∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[
1[T≥τα]
(
1
α
√
2
− α
2
√
2
1
T − g¯τα
)∣∣∣Gt
]
.
Conditional expectation in (4.6) on the event [τα > t],
E
[
1√
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T<τ ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[
E
[
1√
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T<τ ]
∣∣∣Gτα
]∣∣∣∣Gt
]
=
α√
2
E
[
1
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
.
Now, it remains to calculate E[∆Vτ |Gt] on [t < τ ]. Observe that Vτ = 1[τ<T ] =
1[τ≤T ] since Q[τ = T ] = 0. Thus, ∆Vτ = 1[τ≤T ]− Vτ−. Since τα < τ , a.s.,
Vτ− =
(
τ − g¯τα
2
(
1
τ − g¯τα
− 1
T − g¯τα
)
+
τ − g¯τα
T − g¯τα
)
1[τ≤T ]
=
1
2
(
1 +
τ − g¯τα
T − g¯τα
)
1[τ≤T ].
Then,
E[∆Vτ |Gt]1[t<τ ] =
1
2
E[1[τ≤T ]|Gt]1[t<τ ]
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− 1
2
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
1[t<τ ]
=
1
2
E[1[τ≤T ]|Gt]1[t<τ ]
− 1
2
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
1[τα≤t<τ ](4.8)
− 1
2
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
1[t<τα].(4.9)
Conditional expectation in (4.9) on the event [t < τα],
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gτα
]∣∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[(∫ T−g¯τα
α2/2 l/2
√
(α2/2)l−3 dl
T − g¯τα
)
1[τα≤T ]
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.10)
= E
[
α/
√
2(
√
T − g¯τα − α/
√
2 )
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
.
Similarly, conditional expectation in (4.8) on the event [τα ≤ t < τ ],
E
[
Lα
T − g¯τα
1[τ≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
=
α/
√
2(
√
T − g¯t −α/
√
2 )
T − g¯t .
Therefore,
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt]1[t<τ ]
= 1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]
1
2
(
1− t− g¯t
T − g¯t
)
+ 1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]
t− g¯t
T − g¯t
+ 1[t<τα]
α√
2
E
[
1[T≥τα]
(
1
α
√
2
− α
2
√
2
1
T − g¯τα
)∣∣∣Gt
]
+ 1[t<τα]
α2
2
E
[
1
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.11)
+ 1[t<τα]E[1[τα>T ]|Gt]
− 1
2
1[t<τ ]E[1[τ≤T ]|Gt]
+ 1[τα≤t<τ ]
α/(2
√
2 )(
√
T − g¯t −α/
√
2 )
T − g¯t
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+ 1[t<τα]E
[
α/(2
√
2 )(
√
T − g¯τα −α/
√
2 )
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T ]
∣∣∣Gt
]
,
which yields
E[1[τ>T ]|Gt]1[t<τ ] =−1[t<τ ] + 1[t<τ ]1[t≥τα]
(
1 +
t− g¯t
T − g¯t
)
+ 1[t<τα]E
[
1[T≥τα]
(
1 +
α√
2
1√
T − g¯τα
)∣∣∣Gt
]
(4.12)
+ 1[t<τα]2E[1[τα>T ]|Gt]
+ 1[τα≤t<τ ]
α/
√
2(
√
T − g¯t − α/
√
2 )
T − g¯t .
In order to get the price, St, we need to obtain the law of τα on the event
[t < τα] conditional on Gt. To find the Laplace transform of this density we
introduce the following martingale as in Chesney, Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Yor
(1997):
Nt := Ψ(− λµt∧τα) exp
(
−λ
2
2
(t∧ τα)
)
,
where µt =Mt/
√
2 and Ψ(z) =
∫∞
0 x exp(zx− x2/2)dx. Using the optional
stopping theorem, we obtain
E
[
Ψ(− λµτα) exp
(
−λ
2
2
(τα)
)∣∣∣Gt
]
=Ψ(− λµt∧τα) exp
(
−λ
2
2
(t∧ τα)
)
,
which in turn implies
1[t>τα]E
[
exp
(
−λ
2
2
τα
)∣∣∣Gt
]
= 1[t>τα]
Ψ(−λµt) exp((−λ2/2)t)
Ψ(λα/
√
2 )
.
Using relatively standard software, one can invert this Laplace transform
and compute the expectations given in expressions (4.3)–(4.12).
For time 0, using expression (4.12) and rearranging the terms give
S0 = exp
(
−
∫ T
0
ru du
)(
1−
(
Q[τα ≤ T ]− E
[
α/
√
2√
T − g¯τα
1[τα≤T ]
]))
.(4.13)
This is the price of the risky zero coupon bond at time 0. The interpretation
of the last term in this expression is important. Default occurs not at time
τα, but at time τ . The default time τ is, therefore, less likely than the hitting
time τα. The probability Q[τα ≤ T ] is reduced to account for this difference.
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Unfortunately, the law of τα is only known through its Laplace transform,
which is very difficult to invert analytically. See Chesney, Jeanblanc-Picque´
and Yor (1997) in this respect, which gives the following formula:
E
[
exp
(
−λ
2
2
τα
)]
=
1
Ψ(λα/
√
2 )
.
Inverting this Laplace transform yields the law for τα, and given the law for
τα, expression (4.13) is easily computed.
5. Conclusion. This paper provides an alternative method for generat-
ing reduced form credit risk models from structural models. The difference
from Duffie and Lando (2001) is that instead of using filtering theory to go
from the manager’s information to the market’s as in Duffie and Lando, we
use a reduction of the manager’s information set. This modification is both
conceptually and mathematically a different approach to the topic. Indeed,
the perspective from filtering theory is that the market’s information set
is the same as the manager’s, but with additional noise included. The per-
spective from reducing the manager’s information set is that the market’s
information set is the same as the manager’s, but the market just knows less
of it. It would be interesting to investigate more complex structural models
than those used herein and more complex information reductions.
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